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The next day they took me to the Metropolitan Deten-
tion The next day they took me to the Metropolitan
Detention Center (MDC) in Brooklyn, New York.
All of my life, I have never showed my body to any-
one. They made me strip completely. They put me in
maximum security. . . . Neither my father nor grand-
father has ever been in such a situation. We are not
that kind of people. I didn’t speak English and I
* Linus Chan is an Associate Professor of Clinical Law at the University of
Minnesota and the Director of the Detainee Rights Clinic at the James H. Binger Center
for New Americans. He would like to thank Jenna Jonjua for her invaluable research
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didn’t have a cellmate who could help translate for
me. I was completely confused. My biggest concern
was my children. Who would support my children if
something happened to me? . . . I stayed in the high
security jail for one and a half months. . . . I ap-
peared in court in February 2002 and told the judge
that I want to leave. A few months later, I was de-
ported to Pakistan. If they were going to deport me,
why they did not deport me in the beginning? . . .
After staying in jail, my back muscles have stopped
working. I have the sugar disease. The tension
elevated my sugar levels. When I came back to
Pakistan, I checked my sugar, and it was 429 points.
It should be about 120 to 130 points.
—Saleem, Underground America:
Narratives of Undocumented Lives1
For one thing, he says, Browder was losing weight.
“Several times when I visited him, he said, ‘They’re
not feeding me,’” the brother told me. “He definitely
looked really skinny.” In solitary, food arrived
through a slot in the cell door three times a day.
For a growing teenager, the portions were never big
enough, and in solitary Browder couldn’t supple-
ment the rations with snacks bought at the com-
missary. He took to begging the officers for leftovers:
“Can I get that bread?” Sometimes they would slip
him an extra slice or two; often, they refused.
Browder’s brother also noticed a growing tendency
toward despair. When Browder talked about his
case, he was “strong, adamant: ‘No, they can’t do
this to me!’” But, when the conversation turned to
life in jail, “it’s a totally different personality, which
is depressed. He’s, like, ‘I don’t know how long I
can take this.’”
—Gonnerman, Before the Law2
1. Inside an Immigrant Detention Facility, VOICE OF WITNESS, https://voiceofwitness
.org/immigrant-detention-stories [https://perma.cc/N5YU-HR9H].
2. Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law [https://perma.cc/49YN-CQW6]
(providing the account of a teenager held at Rikers for three years awaiting his trial who
later killed himself in 2015); see also Jennifer Gonnerman, Kalief Browder, 1993–2015,
THENEWYORKER (June 7, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kalief-brow
der-1993-2015 [https://perma.cc/6EYF-6HN3].
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Detention is harsh. Criminologists continue a long debate over
whether the severity of punishment plays a role in deterring be-
havior.3 And yet there is no debate that imprisonment after conviction
is meant to be harsh and is intended to cause pain and suffering.
Enduring the period of imprisonment is how one “pays off” the debt to
society, and while criminal punishment cannot be “cruel [or] unusual,”
the pain is the point.4 However, the two men5 who are the subject of
the quotes above are—at least under the law—not being punished
for crimes at all. And yet both of them suffered the pains of impris-
onment, ostensibly for regulatory reasons. Whereas pain and suffering
may be the point of criminal punishment, how much pain and suf-
fering should we permit for people who have not yet been adjudged
guilty of any crime?
Various government agencies in the United States use deten-
tion to accomplish a variety of “nonpunitive” functions. From nearly
the beginning of our nation’s history, the mentally ill, who posed a
danger to themselves or the community, could be imprisoned.6 During
wartime, or even times of insurrection, people could be detained on
grounds of national security.7 But perhaps the two most common
forms of “civil” detention in the United States today are imprisoning
people facing a criminal trial, or those facing deportation in the
United States.
On any given day nearly 470,000 people are in jail awaiting trial
without having been convicted.8 At the same time around 50,000
people on any given day are detained in immigration detention,
many of whom are awaiting deportation.9 Pretrial detention causes
all kinds of downstream harmful effects, including job loss, housing




4. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
5. Mr. Browder was a teenager at the time of his incarceration. See Gonnerman,
supra note 2.
6. See Edward Lyon, Imprisoning America’s Mentally Ill, PRISONLEGALNEWS (Feb.
2019), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2019/feb/4/imprisoning-americas-mentally
-ill [https://perma.cc/D39C-WKL9].
7. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748–49 (1987).
8. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html
[https://perma.cc/E69L-UJ6M].
9. U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T., U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
FISCAL YEAR 2019 ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 5 (2019), https://
www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2019/eroReportFY2019.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9Y3H-EATW] (keeping in mind that ICE statistics don’t desegregate populations
awaiting a deportation order, or those with final orders of removal).
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insecurity and even increased crime.10 And consensus continues to
grow that immigration detention also can lead to the same11 or even
unique harms.12
The United States is currently in the midst of a “third wave of
potential pretrial detention reform.”13 And while certain reforms are
gaining traction in an effort to reduce pretrial criminal detention,
efforts to do the same for immigration detention have lagged.14 Re-
formers and abolitionists make the case that immigration detention
needs to be either restricted or eliminated entirely.15 Nonetheless, the
number of people held in detention for immigration purposes rises
year after year.16 Not only do the numbers of people in immigration
detention grow, but the systems in place have grown less concerned
with the harsh consequences of detention to the most vulnerable.17
While pregnant women and young children have historically been
spared the harsh effects of detention, the last few years have ex-
posed these groups to rising rates of incarceration. The Zero-Tolerance
policy separated children from their mothers through the tool of in-
carceration, a practice that continued well into 2021.18 The invoca-
tion of a public health emergency resulted in minors being expelled
from the United States after being detained in hotel rooms.19 Pregnant
10. See SCAN OF PRETRIAL PRACTICES, PRETRIAL JUST. INST. 1, 19, 32 (2019), https://
university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentF
ileKey=24bb2bc4-84ed-7324-929c-d0637db43c9a&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/SAZ4
-2BN3]; Léon Digard & Elizabeth Swavola, JUSTICEDENIED:THEHARMFUL AND LASTING
EFFECTS OF PRETRIALDETENTION 1, 1–4 (2019), https://www.vera.org/publications/for-the
-record-justice-denied-pretrial-detention [https://perma.cc/QN9Q-QSEM]; Paul Heaton,
Sandra G. Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor
Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 715 (2017).
11. See Migration and Refugee Services/United States Conference of Catholic Bishops
Center for Migration Studies, Unlocking Human Dignity: A Plan to Transform the US
Immigration Detention System, 3 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 159, 163–64, 171 (2015).
12. See Allen S. Keller et al., Mental Health of Detained Asylum Seekers, 362 THE
LANCET 1721, 1721–22 (2003).
13. Alexa Van Brunt & Locke E. Bowman, Toward a Just Model of Pretrial Release:
A History of Bail Reform and a Prescription for What’s Next, 10 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 701, 707 (2018).
14. See CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRATING TO PRISON 143 (2019).
15. See id.
16. Emily Kassie, Detained, MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept. 24, 2019, 1:30 AM), https://
www.themarshallproject.org/2019/09/24/detained.
17. Daniel Hatoum, Abolition of Immigrant Family Detention: Tracing an Evolving
Standard of Decency from Separation Through Imprisonment, 47 HOFSTRA L.REV.1229,
1229–30, 1234 (2019).
18. Id. at 1229–30.
19. Joel Rose & Marisa Peñaloza, Shadow Immigration System: Migrant Children
Detained in Hotels by Private Contractors, NPR (Aug. 20, 2020, 8:04 AM), https://www
.npr.org/2020/08/20/904027735/shadow-immigration-system-migrant-children-detained
-in-hotels-by-private-contrac [https://perma.cc/9VRC-3G7R]; see also Laila L. Hlass, The
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women who previously enjoyed a presumption against incarceration
were detained at an increased rate of eighty percent.20
The COVID-19 pandemic that spread throughout the nation in
2020 and 2021 highlighted how many people were detained despite
serious medical issues. For instance, Juan Manual Hernandez is a
46-year-old who suffers from diabetes, hypertension, high cholesterol
and has survived a heart attack and experienced smoke inhalation
from a house fire.21 Hernandez could not afford his $2000 bond and
spent eight months detained by Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment (ICE) during the pandemic.22 Others have tragically lost their
lives, likely becoming infected with the disease while in immigration
detention.23 How and why did the immigration detention system ig-
nore medical vulnerabilities and still decide to detain those at-risk?
The preference of detention over release is driven by a number
of different factors. Professor Gillman highlights several of them:
the immigration detention system’s reliance on automatic detention,
the overwhelming reliance on monetary bond, and finally the reliance
on “risk factors”—a policy described as the “immigration system’s
adoption of elements from the criminal pretrial system while ignoring
lessons learned in the criminal justice setting.”24 Professor Gillman
goes on to explain that “[u]njustified reliance on ill-fitting pretrial risk
factors from the criminal justice system also leads to flawed custody
decisions.”25 One risk factor in particular—the focus on whether a
person poses a danger to the community—creates a blind spot towards
the harm that detention itself poses. This ignorance flouts a funda-
mental aspect of due process—that the government’s interests must
be balanced against an individual’s liberty.
The risk factors that Professor Gillman references are the risk
of flight and the risk of harm to the community.26 While the first
Adultification of Immigrant Children, 34 GEO.IMMIGR.L. J. 119, 202–03 (2020) (describing
how the immigration system ignores youth-related vulnerabilities, adultifying immigrant
children, who are predominantly children of color).
20. Daniel Gonzalez, ICE Detention of Pregnant Women Soared 80% after Trump
Administration Ended Policy Against It, AZCENTRAL (Apr. 24, 2020, 7:31 PM), https://
www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/immigration/2020/04/24/ice-detention-pregnant
-women-soared-80-after-trump-ended-policy/3017057001 [https://perma.cc/MBW4-TGYM].
21. COVID-19 Habeas Litigation, NAT'L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR. (May 14, 2020), https://
immigrantjustice.org/court_cases/covid-19-habeas-litigation [https://perma.cc/PJ4C-RXNK].
22. Id.
23. DONALDKERWIN,CTR. FOR MIGRATIONSTUD., IMMIGRANTDETENTION AND COVID-
19: HOW A PANDEMIC EXPLOITED AND SPREAD THROUGH THE US IMMIGRANT DETENTION
SYSTEM 1, 3 (2020), https://cmsny.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/CMS-Detention-COVID
-Report-08-12-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LS7-67LX].
24. Denise L. Gillman, To Loose the Bonds: The Deceptive Promise of Freedom from
Pretrial Immigration Detention, 92 IND. L.J. 157, 163 (2016).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 157.
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factor, risk of flight, or the risk of absconding and not appearing at
trial, has been a basis for continuing pretrial detention early on in our
nation’s history, the second risk factor is a relatively new and mod-
ern creation that was solidified in 1984 with the Bail and Reform Act
of 1984.27 It is after this adoption and the Supreme Court’s condona-
tion of the continuance of detention based on a fear for community
safety, that the immigration custody system began to rely on these
factors in their own assessment.28 While there are several reasons
why adoption of the risk factors are problematic, this Article focuses
on how this adoption blinded the immigration detention system to
consider harms of detention. The immigration system’s reliance on
the idea that the government can have a compelling interest in de-
tention, caused it to ignore the need to balance that interest to the
harms inflicted by incarceration.
By turning a blind eye to detention harms, the immigration cus-
todial system categorically subordinates the fundamental liberty
interest against confinement to the government’s ambiguous inter-
est in crime prevention. Part I of this Article will trace the historical
roots of the immigration custodial system with a focus on how early
consideration of harms became subsumed in the modern system.
Part II will discuss the Bail Reform movements and the rise of pre-
venting danger to the community as a legitimate government interest
justifying detention. Part III concludes with a discussion of the immi-
gration system’s adoption of “danger to the community” as a govern-
ment interest, and how it misapprehends key aspects of danger in
the criminal pretrial situation. Finally, Part IV concludes with a
discussion of how a due process analysis mandates consideration of
the injury inflicted by detention in immigration custody decisions.
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION CUSTODY AND HARMS
The Supreme Court in 1896 declared that the power to detain
was a natural aspect of the power to deport:
Proceedings to exclude or expel would be vain if those accused
could not be held in custody pending the inquiry into their true
character and while arrangements were being made for their
deportation. Detention is a usual feature of every case of arrest
on a criminal charge, even when an innocent person is wrong-
fully accused; but it is not imprisonment in a legal sense.29
27. Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 202–03, 98 Stat 1837, 1837 (1984);
see also Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, §§ 3146(b), 3148 80 Stat. 214,
214–16 (1966).
28. Gillman, supra note 24, at 178.
29. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896).
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The Court’s analogy to criminal pretrial detention began a long his-
tory of conflating immigration detention with the criminal process.30
Even as the Court declared that the power to detain came with the
power to deport, it was Congress and administrative agencies that was
tasked to create a system to decide who to detain and for how long.31
Immigration custody, at least the custody attendant pending a
disposition of one’s claim to either enter or stay in the United States,
has from the beginning existed as two distinct sides to the mirror.
The first was the custody applied when the government adjudicates
a claim that a person should be allowed into the United States.32
The second was the custody that occurred when the same govern-
ment was deciding whether to expel or deport a person who already
made an entry into the United States.33 The procedures and more
surprisingly, the factors used in deciding whether to release people
pending these two adjudications evolved separately, under different
constitutional frameworks and ended up creating different regula-
tory language.34 While decisions on whether to release from custody
those who were still trying to enter the United States evolved to
allow consideration of harm that would be imposed by custody,
those factors have remained mostly absent when considering the
release of those awaiting a decision on whether they would be forced
to depart their home and be separated from their family.35
A. Creation of Parole
When people arrive at our borders seeking entry, U.S. officials
are tasked with a decision; to either allow them entry into the United
States, or deny entry and forced the rejected applicants to return to
where they came from. And while this decision often is exercised in the
span of minutes, when the process takes longer, a space is created
to decide whether or not an applicant should be incarcerated or not.36
For some applicants, custody may be ordered, in which case they
must wait between borders and behind bars until a final decision of
admission can be made.37 These decisions can take months or even
years.38 For others, a U.S. official may decide that custody is not
30. Gillman, supra note 24, at 214 (citing Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 235).
31. See HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 14, at 27.
32. Gillman, supra note 24, at 164.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 171–74.
35. See infra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
36. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., IMMIGRATION DETENTION: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 1 (2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R45915.pdf [https://perma.cc/876D-BLC4].
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., id. at 19.
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necessary, and thus allow the applicant “temporary entry” whereby
they are physically inside the United States even as they are legally
still outside of its borders.39 Parole is when immigration officials
decide that custody is unnecessary and temporary entry is allowed.
In 1917, Congress gave the Secretary of Labor the ability to create
regulations to allow for the temporary admission of people pending
inspection, and the Secretary of Labor did so, creating Rule 3 and
Rule 16.40 Rule 3 allowed for temporary admission and release from
custody if hospitalization was necessary, while Rule 16 provided
broader language and referred only to “unusual and grave hardship”
would result if release and temporary admission was denied.41 Rule
3 and Rule 16 were mandates by the Secretary of Labor that deci-
sions to incarcerate must be informed by the potential for harm.
Even as Congress later codified the parole power in the 1952 Im-
migration and Nationality Act, they left discretion to the Agencies in
making the decisions on whether to parole applicants for admission
while awaiting the final decision on whether they would be allowed
admission into the United States.42 The parole statute, while focused
on the temporary entry of applicants, also recognized its implications
on custody—that it would necessarily entail release from custody.43
Between 1952 and well into the 1980s the use of the parole power
to release people from custody was considered commonplace. The
ubiquity of parole and release led the United States Supreme Court
in Leng May Ma v. Butler, to declare “[p]hysical detention of aliens is
now the exception, not the rule, and is generally employed only as
to security risks or those likely to abscond. Certainly, this policy re-
flects the humane qualities of an enlightened civilization.”44
The statute and the regulations that gave the power to parole and
thus release from custody those who sought entry into the United
States provided little guidance. While Rule 3 and Rule 16 had refer-
enced hospitalization, the new regulations contained no such language
and its interpretation of the parole power remained vague and broad.45
It took a humanitarian crisis, a change in Presidential adminis-
tration, and consistent litigation to create more specific guidelines,
39. AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, THE USE OF PAROLE UNDER IMMIGRATION LAW 1 (2018),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_use_of_p
arole_under_immigration_law.pdf [https://perma.cc/R43D-FBNJ].
40. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, IMMIGRATION LAWS AND RULES (4th ed.), r. 3, r. 16 (1917).
41. Id.
42. Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414-477, § 232, 66 Stat. 138,
163.
43. Id. §§ 212(4), 212(d)(5) (“[T]he alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the
custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt
with in the same manner as any other applicant for admission to the United States.”).
44. 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958) (citations omitted).
45. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 212.9 (1958); 8 C.F.R. § 212 (1965); 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (1974).
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and to reverse the presumption of release. Starting in December of
1972, South Florida began to see a large influx of Haitians fleeing
poverty by boat.46
Until 1981, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
had contracted with a group of churches to help resettle and provide
work authorizations for those fleeing Haiti, a reflection of the pre-
sumption that detention would be the exception and release the
general rule.47 At the same time, in 1980 the Mariel Boatlifts began,
whereby boats left to pick up Cubans in Mariel harbor and bring them
back to the United States, a number which exceeded 125,000 people
by the mid-1980s.48 One of the first decisions Ronald Reagan made as
president was to alter the Carter Administration’s policy of release.49
After a task force was created and Attorney General French declared
to Congress that Haitian and Cuban arrivals had to be deterred
through detention, INS began implementing a policy and refusing
to release people under its parole power.50
Despite the stated goal of increased detention, there was little
guidance on what the standards were being used.51 In Louis v. Nelson,
District Judge Spellman from the Southern District of Florida wrote,
“Defendants [INS] can point to no operating instruction, internal
memorandum or other document that completely reflects the official
detention policy.”52 The lack of a written policy eventually led to the
Louis district court ruling that the INS had violated the Administra-
tive Procedures Act and forced the Agency to promulgate new regu-
lations around parole.53
The new interim rule and regulations came with a summary
statement declaring custody was no longer going to be the exception,
and despite the Supreme Court’s pronouncement twenty years earlier
in Lee May Ma, the rule reminded district directors empowered to
grant parole that “district directors should be guided by the fact that
the statutory rule is one of detention, and that the use of parole au-
thority is an exception to that rule and should be carefully and nar-
rowing exercised.”54 Against this backdrop, the new version of the
regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 212.5, took on a completely different look.55
46. See Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 978 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 979–80.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 981.
52. See Louis, 544 F. Supp. at 981.
53. See id. at 979, 1003–04.
54. Detention and Parole of Inadmissible Aliens, 42 Fed. Reg. 30,045 (July 9, 1982).
55. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (1985).
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The new regulation identified factors to consider when deciding
to grant parole and framed parole as the power to release from cus-
tody.56 The first factor the regulation mandated was consideration
for release anyone with “serious medical conditions in which contin-
ued detention would not be appropriate,” then it identified several
other groups—pregnant women, juveniles, those with close family
relatives in the United States who have or may file a visa petition,
witnesses, or those “whose continued detention is not in the public
interest.”57 While declaring that detention would be the presump-
tion, the regulations also made it policy that those who would suffer
from detention—people with medical conditions, juveniles and preg-
nant women—should be considered for release.58 While most of the
identified groups were subject to the requirement that they “present
neither a security risk nor a risk of absconding,” the group identified
with serious medical issues were excluded from that requirement.59
These classifications remained largely unchanged to the modern era.
The Interim Rules’ declaration from the 1980s that reinterpreted
parole as extraordinary and exceptionally rare has proven true over
the last thirty years.60 Parole remains an exception, and, during some
administrations, even a near impossibility.61 Nonetheless, the written
factors used to decide whether to release someone through parole
balances the harm of detention against security or absconding risks.
B. Detention Awaiting Deportation
The Naturalization Act of 1917 created specific rules around
deportation, namely the detention and expulsion of those found
already inside the United States.62 The statute invited the Depart-
ment of Labor to create rules governing the process of deportation.63
The statute itself did not provide much guidance other than that
release from custody pending the deportation case required at least
a $500 surety with a condition that the person show up when re-
quired for hearings or for deportation if necessary.64
56. Id.
57. Detention and Parole of Inadmissible Aliens, 42 Fed. Reg. 30,045 (July 9, 1982).
58. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (1985).
59. Id.
60. See Elliott Young, The Cruel Detention of Immigrants Didn’t Start with Trump—
And It Won’t End With Him, Either, JACOBIN MAG. (2021), https://www.jacobinmag.com
/2021/01/detention-border-control-us-immigration-trump [https://perma.cc/DD5C-2JY6].
61. See id.
62. See Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301 §§ 19–20, 39 Stat. 874, 889–90
(1917).
63. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
IMMIGRATION LAWS AND RULES (4 ed.), r. 21–23 (1917).
64. See Immigration Act of 1917 § 20.
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The rule created by the Department of Labor was titled “Rule
22 Arrest and Deportation on Warrant” covered the procedural re-
quirements for deportation, and a provision that allowed either
those facing deportation to “remain in . . . place” or be placed into
custody.65 A different provision forbade the custody for women and
girls in jails or other similar places “unless such incarceration is
absolutely unavoidable” and instead directing the custody to “phil-
anthropic . . . society.”66 Rule 22 devoted an entire subdivision to the
custody and care of women that had to be detained.67 As for being
released while awaiting detention, the Rules mirrored the statutory
language and simply stated, “[t]he amount of any bond under which
an arrested alien may be released shall be $500.”68 However, the
Rule also states that for those “who are unable to give bail shall be
held in jail only in case no other secure place of detention can be
found.”69 These Rules remained largely in place, without adding much
to the discretionary guidelines of when and who should be granted
bail upon release.
The next statutory change didn’t come until thirty years later
with fears of communism, when Congress wrote the Internal Security
Act of 1950.70 This Act was aimed at Communist members, both citi-
zens and not.71 The first title was primarily aimed against noncitizens,
or newly naturalized citizens.72 One provision amended the 1917 Act
on detention for those facing detention, adding a provision that clari-
fied that the government could decide to continue custody, along with
the potential release on $500 bond, or release on conditional parole.73
A $500 surety was no longer a guarantee of release. The provision
did not mandate custody for any specific group—including those who
faced deportation based on communist membership.74
The passage of this Act, resulted in the re-detention of a num-
ber of people previously released on bail and litigation.75 A group of
five petitioners held under this provision and denied the opportunity
65. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, IMMIGRATION LAWS & RULES (4th ed.), r. 22 subds. 5–10
(1917).
66. Id. at r. 22 subd. 10.
67. Id.
68. Id. at r. 22 subd. 6.
69. Id.
70. Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831 § 2, 64 Stat. 987–89 (1950).
71. Id.
72. Id. §§ 23, 25.
73. Id. § 23, 64; see also Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301 § 11, 39 Stat.
874, 881–82 (1917). There had been prior court decisions that interpreted the 1917
language as providing for release on bail as a matter of right.
74. See Internal Security Act of 1950 § 23, 64.
75. The Internal Security Act of 1950, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 624, 636 n.297, 659 (1951).
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to post bail, filed for habeas corpus alleging that a denial of bail
violated due process and the Eighth Amendment.76
Though the five petitioners won on their habeas corpus claim
in the appellate court, the government appealed, and in Carlson v.
Landon, the Supreme Court had to decide the constitutionality of
refusing to grant release under the new detention statute.77 The
Court noted that Congress expressly decided to adopt one judicial
interpretation of the 1917 statute allowing for detention rather than
release and that Congress explicitly made the choice that bail was
not a right.78 The Court ruled that no due process violation took
place, noting that many of those previously held were released on
bail, and there didn’t appear to be any abuse of discretion in those
decisions.79 As for the Eighth Amendment challenge, without ex-
plaining why, the Court simply stated, “We think, clearly, here that
the Eighth Amendment does not require that bail be allowed under
the circumstances of these cases.”80 These custody provisions later
survived in the 1952 Naturalization Act.81
From 1952 until 1988, Congress did not revise the custody pro-
vision meaningfully and instead allowed the administrative agen-
cies to sort out their own requirements.82 The regulations however
did not provide any specific guidance on how district directors were
to exercise their discretion in “continuing custody,” releasing on bond
or releasing on conditional parole.83 Instead the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals (BIA) through agency decisions began to provide guid-
ance on the release decisions made under the INA 242 statute.84
Just as the Supreme Court in Leng had declared that detention
as attendant to exclusion was rare in the 1950s, the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals in 1976 through Matter of Patel made a similar dec-
laration, ruling that a person “generally is not and should not be
detained or required to post bond except on a finding that he is a
threat to the national security, or that he is a poor bail risk.”85 Aside
76. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 528–29, 531 (1952).
77. See id. at 526–28.
78. See id. at 539–40.
79. See id. at 542.
80. Id. at 546.
81. See Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831 § 23, 64 Stat. 987, 1010–12
(1950); Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414-477 § 212(5), 66 Stat.
163, 208–12 (1952).
82. See Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952 § 212(5); H.R. 5210, 100th Cong.
(1988) (enacted).
83. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.2 (1997); 8 C.F.R. § 242.3 (1997); Aliens: Apprehension, Custody
and Determination of Deportability, 18 Fed. Reg. 3530 (June 19, 1953).
84. See In re Patel 15 I&N Dec. 666, 666–67 (B.I.A. 1976); In re San Martin 15 I&N
Dec. 167, 168–69 (B.I.A. 1974).
85. See In re Patel, 15 I&N Dec. at 666 (internal citations omitted).
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from creating the presumption of release, the BIA had also provided
the first administrative guidance as to when a person should be
released—as long as they are not a poor bail risk or a risk to na-
tional security.86
In earlier decisions the Board had wrestled with the question
of whether felons or those with a criminal history could be held in
custody without bond. Decided two years before the Patel decision,
the Board in Matter of San Martin reviewed a case in which an
immigration judge refused to grant bond even though the district
director in that case had set a bond in the amount of $15,000.87 The
immigration judge’s decision to deny bond entirely was “because of
the potential threat posed by the respondent to society” based on the
man’s convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana.88 The
San Martin panel rejected the immigration judge’s denial of bond
and wrote, “the respondent should be released under bond. We are
concerned primarily, with assuring his appearance in the immigra-
tion proceedings.”89 In other words, the poor bail risk was the pri-
mary concern, not any potential threat to society, and on that basis
a bond was appropriate—a high bond, but a bond, nonetheless.
After the Patel decision, the release provisions governing parole
and those governing people awaiting deportation were remarkably
similar. Congressional statutory authority was broad, and the regu-
latory authority provided little guidance. By the end of the 1990s,
release under parole and release awaiting detention no longer was
the default or presumed.90 But there was one key difference. Even
as parole authority narrowed, the regulations still contemplated the
importance of avoiding detention for those who were vulnerable.91
Not so for those awaiting deportation.92 Not only was the detention
becoming the default for many if not most, but Agency decisions
turned a blind eye to the harms of detention.
Why did immigration authorities begin to treat detention for
the purpose of deportation so differently than the power to parole
people in the United States? Both statutory authorities, parole and
detention awaiting deportation were written in the 1950s, and both
allowed broad discretion, and yet one set of regulations interpreted the
parole statute to allow consideration for harm of detention, whereas
the other regulation and agency guidance on immigration custody
86. See id.
87. See In re San Martin, 15 I&N Dec. at 167–68.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 168.
90. Cf. Analysis of Immigration Detention Policies, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other
/analysis-immigration-detention-policies [https://perma.cc/Q4AY-KC27].
91. See discussion supra Sections I.A–B.
92. See discussion supra Sections I.A–B.
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focused exclusively on community danger and flight risk and ignored
harm that was being imposed by detention.93
The answer lies in the framing of the purpose of detention and
on timing. While parole was an exercise of the nation’s power to con-
trol migration—after all, it was used to allow temporary admission
into the United States—the power to detain while awaiting deporta-
tion proceedings became increasingly analogous to pretrial criminal
detention. Because the parole regulations were written in 1982 just
prior to the Bail Reform Act of 1984,94 the justification of detention
because of community harm had not yet been condoned by Congress
or the Supreme Court. While the detention awaiting deportation
rules were reformed right after the Bail Reform Act of 1984 and
Salerno the comparison and analogy to pretrial criminal detention
became too strong to resist. Immigration authorities inspired by the
criminal pretrial detention reforms focused on “danger to the commu-
nity” and subsequently began to ignore the harm of incarceration.
II. CRIMINAL BAIL REFORM AND THE RISE OF PREVENTING
COMMUNITY HARM AS A GOVERNMENT INTEREST
Reforming pretrial criminal detention, and specifically the crimi-
nal bail system, has come in American history through several
“waves.”95 These waves have been characterized by differing, and at
times opposing, concerns. The system of requiring a monetary bail
prior to release from detention after one’s arrest, and before the
completion of a trial did not exist during the colonial period.96 Prior
to the modern age, bail worked under a surety arrangement, where
payment was only expected if a person did not show up to court, and
people had to rely on family and friends to agree to the sureties.97
Once urbanization occurred and communities become less personal,
the poor needed another way to access sureties to pay bail, and the
modern bail system was created; people had to prepay in order to
get released, and an industry developed around lending money for
the payment of bonds.98 By the late 1920s, more people were study-
ing the application of the bail system in the various states, with one
such empirical study done by Arthur Beeley in 1927 studying the
93. See discussion supra Sections I.A–B.
94. Detention and Parole of Inadmissible Aliens, 42 Fed. Reg. 30,045 (July 9, 1982);
Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465 §§ 3146–52 80 Stat. 214, 214–17 (1966).
95. Van Brunt & Bowman, supra note 13, at 703, 705, 770.
96. June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic
Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 530–31 (1983).
97. Id. at 519–21.
98. Van Brunt & Bowman, supra note 13, at 714–16.
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bail system in Cook County Jail, where defendants were held pretrial
in Chicago.99 That study found that bail amounts were set arbitrarily,
not with any regard to the ability to pay, used a “standardization”
policy that ignored individual concerns, and finally, was often too
excessive.100 This one study launched many more and piqued the
interest of scholars, leading to research and bail studies throughout
the country.101 These studies eventually launched the first wave of
bail reform in the 1960s.102
The 1960s reform movement was ignited by the concern that
many poor and indigent people were deliberately being detained for
no other reason than they could not afford to pay a bail amount.103
One study from Philadelphia showed that judges didn’t inquire into
financial ability to pay and instead decided bail based on the nature
of the accused offense.104 In New York, the Vera Institute launched
the Manhattan Bail Project, designed to promote release without
paying any bail and which attempted to track what factors deter-
mined risk of absconding from trial.105 These successful efforts to
show that release without any bail amount led to very low rates of
absconding eventually made their way to Congress.
The Bail Reform Act of 1966106 was a major progressive reform
and the first attempt to modify the federal bail system since the 1789
Judiciary Act.107 It was specifically designed to ease the financial
burden of bail on the poor facing criminal trials.108 The Act, which
could only be used for those facing federal crimes, expanded the use
of release on recognizance.109 The bail system was not eliminated,
and a money bail could be required if there was a flight risk, and
courts could deny bail if a defendant appeared to be an unacceptable
flight risk.110
99. Id. at 717.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 718, 723.
102. Id. at 718, 723–24.
103. Id. at 723–24.
104. Caleb Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in
Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1034–35 (1954).
105. Van Brunt & Bowman, supra note 13, at 724.
106. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465 §§ 3146–52 80 Stat. 214, 214–17 (1966).
107. Van Brunt & Bowman, supra note 13, at 725, 725 n.117.
108. See Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the Bail Reform Act of 1966
(June 22, 1966), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27666#axzz2htZwrKnK [http://
perma.cc/TFP5-M42H] (saying, “[b]ecause of the bail system, the scales of justice have been
weighted for almost two centuries not with fact, nor law, nor mercy. They have been
weighted with money. But now, because of the Bail Reform Act of 1966, which an un-
derstanding and just Congress has enacted and which I will shortly sign, we can begin to
insure that defendants are considered as individuals—and not as dollar signs.”).
109. Bail Reform Act of 1966 § 3146(a).
110. Id. §§ 3146(b), 3148.
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This first wave of bail reform became hugely successful in that
many states and other criminal justice systems adopted its prac-
tices.111 Release without bail became more commonplace and commu-
nity programs developed to help ensure court appearances without
bail.112 In form, if not in function, the bail system was no longer
supposed to punish the poor.
A. Expansion of Pretrial Criminal Detention
The attention and focus on the bail system began to shift during
the War on Drugs and the backlash to progressive criminal reform
began to build in the 1970s and 80s.113 As people began to be re-
leased based on the bail reforms,114 concern began to grow about
these same people committing crimes while out on bail.115 Even before
the 1966 Bail Reform Act, states and the courts viewed protection
of witnesses from coercion and other interference with the judicial
process as a basis to deny release on bail,116 but the concern was not
just the criminal trial process, but crimes in general being committed
by people out on bail.117 At the same time, many state courts were
reluctant to use the bail system as a means of “preventive detention,”
and some even interpreted their own Constitutions as prohibiting
the denial of bail to protect the public.118
Congress didn’t feel as constrained, and it passed the District
of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970.119 The
statute allowed judges to detain people without bail if they found
that public safety would be endangered by release, while important
limitations were in place, such as that only those charged with “dan-
gerous crime[s]” could be held in such a manner, and other due pro-
cess practices were employed such as hearings, and time limits.120
The D.C. Court of Appeals, in United States v. Edwards,121 upheld the
111. See Van Brunt & Bowman, supra note 13, at 723–30.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 705, 727–30.
114. State criminal justice reforms took their cues from the federal government, and
many adopted the reforms contained in the Bail Reform Act of 1966. See ABA STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE 39–40, 52–53 (3d ed. 2007).
115. Van Brunt & Bowman, supra note 13, at 731.
116. See Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662, 669 (1962); Fernandez v. United States,
81 S. Ct. 642, 643–44 (1961).
117. See Van Brunt & Bowman, supra note 13, at 731.
118. In re Underwood, 508 P.2d 721, 724 n.5 (Cal. 1973).
119. District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473, 473, 475 (1970).
120. Id. § 23-1332(a).
121. 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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statute and ruled that (1) pretrial detention without bail in this con-
text was regulatory and not punitive,122 (2) that regulatory interest
was to prevent crime occurring while people were on bail, and (3)
there was no fundamental right to bail in all circumstances.123
After the Edwards decision, a majority of states began to incor-
porate dangerousness into consideration of bail. By 1984, thirty-four
states had added danger to their consideration of bail and denial of
release.124 Some states had to amend their own Constitutions’ bail
by right provisions, but nonetheless, by the mid 1980s, concern about
crimes committed by those out on bail had risen dramatically.125 While
being poor was not a proper reason for confinement, being danger-
ous was increasingly seen as an acceptable reason for denying bail.
In the juvenile context, the Supreme Court ruled that a New
York statute, which allowed for the detention of juveniles who were
being held for dangerousness and who “may before the return date
commit an act which if committed by an adult would constitute a
crime,” was constitutional.126 This preventative detention of juve-
niles was not the same as pretrial detention; these juveniles were
being held for delinquency proceedings, but more importantly, the
Court found that this form of detention was not punishment and
was regulatory.127 The statute at issue in Schall had a limit of a
seventeen-day maximum that juveniles would be held in “halfway
house[s]” and dormitories designed for different ages, and finally,
that the entire juvenile system had to consider the “best interests of
the juvenile,” even in detention decisions.128 The Supreme Court
relied on the notion that preventative detention was a part of the
State’s parens patriae power, its obligation to protect minors, not
just from the community, but from themselves.129 The Court was
unconcerned with the notion of predicting future risk, writing, “that
from a legal point of view there is nothing inherently unattainable
about a prediction of future criminal conduct.”130
Denial of release may not be explicitly predicated on being poor
anymore, but different systems from Washington D.C. to juvenile
122. The regulatory and punitive divide was given a central role by the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537–40 (1979).
123. Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1330.
124. John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail Reform,
76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 15 (1985).
125. Id. at 15, 20.
126. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 255–57 (1984) (quoting New York Jud. Law § 320.5
(McKinney 1983) (Family Court Act)).
127. Id. at 256–57, 257 n.4, 270.
128. Id. at 264, 266–68, 270–71.
129. Id. at 265, 271.
130. Id. at 278–79.
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court systems began to assert that potential danger to the commu-
nity was a valid justification to incarcerate. Congress took the next
step and reformed the federal bail system.
B. Second Wave of Bail Reform—The Bail Reform Act of 1984
The Supreme Court upheld the juvenile preventative detention
statute in June of 1984, and Congress was already at work on the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 as part of the larger Comprehensive Crime Bill
of 1983.131 Congress had begun to hold hearings in 1983 and investi-
gate and decry the issue of people committing crimes while out on
bail.132 In October of 1984, Congress passed the Bail Reform Act of
1984 and, like the provision eighteen years earlier, it reflected a major
change on bail policy.133 Congress reacted to the concerns of danger
while out on bail, and it passed a number of provisions: (1) release
on recognizance was still given a wide preference, though it would
be forbidden based on flight risk or if it “will endanger the safety of
any other person or the community,” (2) conditions could be imposed
to increase chance of appearing in court or to decrease any danger
to the community, (3) and finally, if “no condition . . . will reasonably
assure the appearance of the [defendant] . . . and the safety of . . . the
community,” the person must be held in detention without bail.134
Congress also provided specific factors that were to be consid-
ered: information about the charge; the weight of evidence; history
and characteristics of the person, including physical, mental, financial
and standing in the community; and if during the arrest, the person
was already out on parole or bail.135 Lastly, Congress required an
evaluation of the nature and seriousness of the danger posed by a
person’s release.136 These factors must be considered by the court,
and none could be disregarded or ignored, even if they were given
different weight.137
The 1984 Bail Reform Act provisions kept the presumption of re-
lease and the consideration of factors, such as ability to pay and
community ties, in order to evaluate the risk of absconding, but
131. Id. at 253, 281; Van Brunt & Bowman, supra note 13, at 732.
132. See Bail Reform Act: Hearings H.R. 1098, H.R. 3005, and H.R. 3491 Before the
H.Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 2 (1983) (statement of Congressman Robert W.
Kastenmeier).
133. Van Brunt & Bowman, supra note 13, at 732.
134. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b)–(e).
135. Id. § 3142(g).
136. Id.
137. See United States v. Torres, 929 F.2d 291, 291–92 (7th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Gebro, 948 F.2d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Congress also added the additional question of danger138—and
phrased it in such a way that a person who posed a danger, and who
the court could not find any reasonable conditions that would reduce
the danger posed by the person, could not be bailed out.
C. Salerno v. United States
The alleged head of the Genovese crime family, Anthony Salerno,
and a captain of the same family, Vincent Cafaro, were indicted in
March of 1986.139 After conducting a hearing under the Bail Reform
Act under 18 U.S.C. § 1324(e), the District Court denied bail in any
amount and ordered custody to be continued.140 The Second Circuit
ruled that the Act’s allowance for detention based solely on future
danger was facially unconstitutional.141 The Government filed for
certiorari and the Supreme Court decided the case in May of 1987.142
The defendants challenged the constitutionality of their deten-
tion, arguing that (1) preventative detention prior to trial, regardless
of the strength of the government interest, violated the substantive
due process clause as it was a punitive detention that would abro-
gate the innocence standard; (2) the procedures in place, including
the vagueness of the danger standard itself, were unfair enough
such that the risk of erroneous deprivation was too high to comply
with procedural due process; and finally, (3) the statute violated the
Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment.143
The petitioners and several amici argued that preventative de-
tention of competent adults could never be justified by a government
interest.144 In other words, “at the end of that continuum stands a wall
erected by the Due Process Clause which no government interest—
rational, important, compelling or otherwise—may surmount.”145
The respondents argued that the “regulatory” interest, namely pub-
lic safety, was merely a runaround of the protections provided for
criminal defendants; preventative detention of a competent adult
standing trial for a crime was in fact punishing him or her for a
crime that he or she was not yet convicted of.146
138. See 19 U.S.C. § 3142(b).
139. United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 66 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’d, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
140. Id. at 66–67.
141. Id. at 64, 74–75.
142. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
143. Id. at 746, 749, 752.
144. Brief for Respondent, United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (No.86-87),
1986 WL 727532, at *16–17.
145. Id. at *16.
146. Amici of ACLU, United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (No. 86-87), 1986
WL 727537, at *17–24.
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The Salerno majority rejected the petitioner’s arguments: first
by refusing to classify pretrial detention as punitive, writing in a
near tautological fashion, “Congress did not formulate the pretrial
detention provisions as punishment for dangerous individuals. Con-
gress instead perceived pretrial detention as a potential solution to
a pressing societal problem. There is no doubt that preventing danger
to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal.”147 The Court refused
to recognize the wall which respondents argued existed between the
detention of competent adults and an absence of a criminal convic-
tion.148 Instead the Court categorized pretrial detention in the same
ambit as the government’s wartime powers to detain suspected
enemies, its power to detain and commit the mentally ill who were
dangerous to themselves and others, those who were not competent
to stand trial, those facing deportation, dangerous juveniles facing
a delinquency proceeding, and those arrested prior to their bail
hearing.149 The Court analyzed the Government’s interest in pre-
venting crime for a specific class of arrestees—those accused of
serious crimes and those who the Government had probable cause
to believe committed the crimes—was substantial enough to over-
come the individual liberty interest.150
The Court also continually described the procedures involved as
extensive. According to the Court, detention was not going to be
prolonged as it was constrained by the Speedy Trial Act, the Gov-
ernment bore a clear and convincing standard of proof and burden,
and the provisions denying all bail was to be applied only to a subset
of people—those charged with especially serious felonies meant that
the procedures provided due process.151 The Court then disposed of the
Excessive Bail Clause argument by referencing back to the Carlson
v. Landon case, noting that the excessive bail clause does not inher-
ently mean bail is allowed in all cases.152
There were important limitations to the Court’s ruling. The
Court had continually flagged the fact that the defendants’ chal-
lenges were facial, meaning that the bar was extremely high and
then wrote in a footnote, that “[w]e intimate no view as to the point
at which detention in a particular case might become excessively
prolonged, and therefore punitive, in relation to Congress’ regula-
tory goal.”153 In other words, the procedures and process of detention
147. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (internal citations omitted).
148. Id. at 748.
149. Id. at 748–49 (citations omitted).
150. Id. at 750–51.
151. Id. at 751–52.
152. Id. at 752–55 (1987).
153. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 n.4.
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could lead to an unconstitutional application, but that was not the
case before the Court then. The facial aspect to the current case was
important in one other respect: whereas the government interests—to
protect against crimes committed while out on bail—could be con-
sidered and weighed, the individual’s liberty interest, was not—the
Court noted, “we cannot categorically state that pretrial detention
[offends a fundamental liberty interest].”154 Because this was a facial
challenge, Mr. Salerno’s liberty interest and weighing of the harm
of detention was not proper.
So how did the Salerno decisions leave things? The Court defi-
nitely ruled that in some circumstances the government’s interest in
preventing harm to community could outweigh an individual arrestee
who was found to have probable cause to have committed a specific
subset of dangerous crimes.155 By not deciding the length of deten-
tion’s effect on the nature of the detention and leaving a case-by-
case analysis open, the Court did not decide that every time danger
to the community was implicated it overrode an individual’s funda-
mental liberty interest in being free from incarceration.156 But what
it clearly did was elevate the government’s interest in protecting the
community as a potential justification to deny bail and thus release.
D. Post-Salerno and Its Impact
One decision post-Salerno verified that the government’s interest
in community protection does not always outweigh an individual’s
liberty interest. In Foucha v. Louisiana, the Court was confronted
with a commitment statute that allowed holding a person after they
were acquitted by reason of insanity, and even after they were
treated and found to no longer be mentally ill if they were found still
dangerous.157 In striking down the statute, Justice O’Connor wrote
in a concurrence:
Nor would it be permissible to treat all acquittees alike, without
regard for their particular crimes. For example, the strong interest
in liberty of a person acquitted by reason of insanity but later
found sane might well outweigh the governmental interest in
detention where the only evidence of dangerousness is that the
acquittee committed a nonviolent or relatively minor crime.158
154. Id. at 750–51 (emphasis added).
155. See id. at 754–55.
156. See id. at 754.
157. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 73 (1992).
158. Id. at 88 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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According to Justice O’Connor, the government’s interest on danger-
ousness is not static, or uniform, and it can vary depending on the
individual’s situation.159
The Salerno decision had a far wide-ranging effect and led to
increased incarceration across the board—even when defendants
were given bail. As Brunt and Bowman explain, even though Salerno
did not say anything about the use of bonds set at an excessive
amount to effectuate preventative detention, that is how many States
applied and effected that decision.160 In Illinois, authors of a study
that looked at the bail system found that release on own recogni-
zance was used increasingly sparingly, that up to forty percent were
detained throughout the pretrial phase, and the vast majority of
those individuals had bail set, but could not afford it.161 Courts were
not having to rely on a finding that no conditions could be met to
allow release, they could simply set conditions high enough in the
name of public safety, knowing that no release would be possible.162
By naming “danger to the community” as a potential justification for
detention, the Supreme Court created a new norm allowing magis-
trates and courts to engage in risk analysis, often to the detriment
of the accused. Because those held in pretrial detention were already
accused of a crime and their arrest justified under probable cause,
the road to incarceration as the default was built.
III. IMMIGRATION DETENTION’S FOCUS ON DANGER
MAKE IT BLIND TO HARM
Requiring the consideration of harm when making custody de-
cisions seems intuitive, and yet immigration detention centers are
filled with people who are obviously suffering in detention. These jails
are filled with asylum seekers and former refugees who suffered
severe past trauma or even torture.163 ICE regularly detains pregnant
women, minors, those who suffer from severe mental illness, and
even people who suffer from serious chronic health problems.164 The
detention centers themselves, often county jails, are rife with allega-
tions of abuse and mistreatment.165 The immigration regulations
159. See id.
160. Van Brunt & Bowman, supra note 13, at 739.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 739–42.
163. See Stephen H. Legomsky, The Detention of Aliens: Theories, Rules, and Discretion,
30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 531, 541 (1999).
164. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-36, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT:
ARRESTS, DETENTIONS, AND REMOVALS, AND ISSUES RELATED TO SELECTED POPULATIONS
(2019).
165. Monsy Alvarado et al., Deaths in Custody. Sexual Violence. Hunger Strikes. What
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and agency decisions that govern the custody process are utterly
lacking in discussion of the harms of detention when deciding custody
decisions. How has the agency been able to turn a blind eye to the pain
and suffering that detention can inflict even as ICE officers and im-
migration judges decide thousands of custody decisions every day?
One answer is the “asymmetric incorporation of criminal justice
norms” by the immigration system generally and by the detention
system specifically.166 Even as detention attendant to deportation
began to closely mirror the criminal pretrial system, it failed to adopt
key features of that system.167 First, the immigration system failed
to incorporate any of the procedural protections outlined as crucial
in the Salerno court, the most prominent being a lack of an individ-
ualized hearing in all cases, and the burden of proof being placed on
the detainee.168 This failure to adopt such procedural protections has
thus far been of no constitutional merit in the Supreme Court,169 as
the Court has ruled that mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c) does not offend due process.170 But more germane to this
Article, the immigration custody system has also failed to appreciate
how criminal pretrial detention treats the concept of danger to the
community.171 The current immigration custody framework treats
the government’s interest of protecting against danger as a monolithic
interest that automatically trumps an individual’s liberty interest
regardless of what it may be.172 If there is any risk that there is
danger to the community, then the harm inflicted on the detainee
is moot. This formulation cannot be supported, not by common sense
nor by a careful understanding of due process protections.
Ordinarily in order to take away a person’s freedom, the govern-
ment’s interest must outweigh the individual’s liberty interest.173 The
current immigration custody system ignores this principle and in-
stead treats the government interests as monolithic and able to trump
any individual interest in freedom. Two key mistaken assumptions
We Uncovered Inside ICE Facilities Across the US, USA TODAY (Dec. 19, 2019), https://
www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/nation/2019/12/19/ice-asylum-under-trump-exclusive
-look-us-immigration-detention/4381404002 [https://perma.cc/2USU-ANKF].
166. Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorpora-
tion of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 523 (2007).
167. Id. at 472.
168. See id. at 521, 533–34.
169. Several challenges in lower courts have produced orders for immigration authori-
ties to enforce procedural protections, such as an imposition of a burden of proof on ICE
and consideration of the ability to pay. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 36, at 13.
170. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003).
171. Legomsky, supra note 166, at 474, 479.
172. See id. at 489–90.
173. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 88 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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drive the Agency’s faulty interpretation: first, that the question of
danger to the community is somehow a binary one rather than a
risk assessment, and second, that the specific individual’s interest
in liberty is static and need not be considered.
A. Considering Danger in Immigration Custody Decisions
Right after the Salerno decision, but before Congress changed
the custody statute the Board of Immigration Appeals in 1987 used
a detainee’s criminal history to justify setting a bond in the amount
of $10,000, but avoided invoking any potential threat to the commu-
nity, explaining that:
We consider the respondent’s extensive and recent criminal record
to be a very serious matter militating against his release without
a significant bond. While we do not consider a criminal record per
se a reasonable basis for a high bond amount, we find it a relevant
consideration in determining the necessity for or the appropriate
amount of bond insofar as it related to a respondent’s character.174
The Board did not use criminal history to measure potential danger,
but instead referred to the history as a reflection of a person’s char-
acter and therefore respect for the law and likelihood of returning
to court.175 While the Board didn’t directly tie criminal history with
the need for custody, Congress stepped in and not only made crimi-
nal history important but made the link to custody explicit.
In 1988, Congress passed the Anti-Drug and Abuse Act (ADAAA)
of 1988.176 Congress first created a new class of deportees, “aggra-
vated felon[s],” and required immediate custody and a denial of the
possibility of release.177 This draconian turn came about from a con-
fluence of the War on Drugs, the Cuban Marielito Freedom Flotillas
and the Haitian influx of the 1970s and ’80s.178
By 1990, several district courts had struck down the complete
denial of bail on due process grounds, and Congress rewrote the
provision again in 1990.179 In IMMACT 90, the provision this time
174. In re Andrade, 19 I&N Dec. 488, 490 (B.I.A. 1987).
175. See id.
176. Anti-Drug and Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181.
177. Id. § 7343(a)(2) (“Attorney General shall not release such felons from custody.”).
178. César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61
UCLA L. REV.1346, 1360–69 (2014) (providing a detailed explanation of the intermingling
of the immigration concerns with the drug trade and criminality and the legislative
responses of the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s).
179. Joe v. INS, No. 90-12313-Z-20, 1990 WL 167457, at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 26, 1990);
Paxton v. INS, 745 F. Supp. 1261, 1266 (E.D. Mich. 1990); Agunobi v. Thornburgh, 745
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allowed for the release of aggravated felons who were lawful perma-
nent residents180 so long as the “Attorney General determines that
the alien is not a threat to the community and that the alien is likely
to appear before any scheduled hearings.”181 The statute walked back
its complete denial of discretion to the Attorney General, and for the
first time the statute invoked “danger to the community” as a reason
to deny release.182 Up until this point, immigration statutes were
silent on reasons to deny release, and as mentioned supra, Agency
decisions did not see the role of immigration custody as preventing
generalized community harm. There is little doubt that the Supreme
Court’s identification of danger to the community in Salerno influ-
enced if not inspired this turn of phrase.
By 1996 Congress went back to a mandatory detention scheme
for those with certain types of convictions that qualified as “aggra-
vated felonies” as well as drug and gun offenses.183 At the same time
Congress revived the old general discretion language for those who
didn’t fall under mandatory custody.184 Congress discarded any
reference to “danger to the community” in the statute.
Congress created two classes of people awaiting deportation de-
cisions: those that could not be released during deportation proceed-
ings regardless of discretion, and those that the Attorney General had
broad discretion to detain, release on a bond of at least $1500, or
grant conditional parole to.185 And yet the Agency, when deciding
when to release those it had power to release, did not revert back to
the practices described in Matter of Patel. Instead, the BIA in Matter
of Adeniji through a bizarre twist reversed the presumption of release
F. Supp. 533, 537 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Leader v. Blackman, 744 F. Supp. 500, 508 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); Chao Yang v. INS, 3-90-CV-300 (D. Minn. June 27, 1990); Kellman v. INS, 750 F.
Supp. 625, 626–27 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). But see Davis v. Weiss, 749 F. Supp. 47, 52–53 (D.
Conn. 1990); Morrobel v. Thornburgh, 744 F. Supp. 725, 727–28 (E.D. Va. 1990); Eden
v. Thornburgh, No. 90-1473-CIV-KEHOE (S.D. Fla. July 23, 1990) (finding the statute
was held to be a valid exercise of Congress’ broad power to regulate the admission and
exclusion of aliens).
180. See Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments
of 1991, Pub. L. No.102-232 § 306, 105 Stat. 1733, 1751 (1991). By December of 1991,
Congress revised the statute to allow release for any lawfully admitted person convicted
of an aggravated felony and not just a lawful permanent resident.
181. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649 § 504, 104 Stat. 4978, 5050 (1990).
182. See Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments
of 1991 § 306.
183. Gerard Savaresse, When Is When?: 8 U.S.C. 1226(C) and the Requirements of
Mandatory Detention, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 285, 297(2013).
184. See Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414-477 § 212(5), 66 Stat.
163, 208–09 (1952); Immigration & Nationality Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208 § 236(a),
110 Stat. 1, 585 (1996).
185. See 8 C.F.R. § 212(5) (1997); 8 U.S.C. § 1226.
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and required detainees to prove by clear and convincing evidence,
a lack of danger to people or property and lack of flight risk.186
The BIA in Adeniji echoing the language from Salerno evoked
two government interests that justified detention protecting people
and property, or was otherwise a flight risk, and made those factors
exclusive.187
In case after case following Matter of Adeniji, the BIA directed
immigration courts to frame evidence under the rubric of danger and
flight risk.188 Despite a broad list of potential evidence that an im-
migration judge could consider,189 the listed evidence factors by the
Board directly tie to the question of (1) is the detainee a danger to peo-
ple or property?190 And, if not, then (2) would they pose a flight risk?191
In no case did the Board mention whether the physical or mental
condition of the detainee made them unsuitable for detention.192
B. Dangerousness as a Character Trait Rather than Risk
Assessment
When considering whether a person would be too dangerous to be
released, the Board of Immigration Appeals has described danger to
be a binary decision: either a person is dangerous or not.193 However,
whether a person is dangerous is inevitably a prediction of future be-
havior, and should be a risk assessment rather than a character trait.
Any analysis on whether release from custody would pose danger
to people or property requires a prediction, aka a “risk analysis.”194 No
186. In re Adeniji, 22 I&N Dec. 1102, 1116 (B.I.A. 1999). For a more detailed analysis
of how the Board twisted a regulation for a different statute to interpret the requirements
for release of people not subject to mandatory detention, see Mary Holper, The Beast of
Burden in Immigration Bond Hearings, 67 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 75, 90–95 (2016); see
also Gillman, supra note 24, at 175–78.
187. In re Adeniji, 22 I&N Dec. at 1113.
188. See id. at 1116; In re Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. 37, 40 (B.I.A. 2006); In re Rolle, No.:
AXXX XX# 103-POM, 2011 WL 400445, at *1 (B.I.A. Jan. 25, 2011); In re Siniauskas, 27
I&N Dec. 207, 207 (B.I.A. 2018).
189. See In re Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. at 40 (enumerating factors such as (1) fixed address,
(2) length of residence, (3) family ties and ability to stay in the U.S. permanently, (4) em-
ployment history, (5) history of appearing in court, (6) the criminal record, (7) immigration
history, (8) any attempts to flee, and (9) manner of entry. None of the listed factors include
consideration of the detainee’s health or well-being, or whether even detention may
become inhumane or difficult. All of the listed factors continue to be directly related to
only questions of danger or risk).
190. See id. at 38.
191. See id.
192. See, e.g., id. (considering danger to people and property and flight risk rather than
physical or mental condition and suitability for detention).
193. See Kate Evans & Robert Koulish, Manipulating Risk: Immigration Detention
Through Automation, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 45–46.
194. See id.
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assessment can predict with 100% accuracy whether a person would
cause future harm: a person could have no past history that indicates
a propensity for violence but nevertheless cause serious damage to
people or property in the future, whereas, with regard to a person with
a long history of violent behavior, they may pose no further danger.
Labeling someone as “too dangerous” to be released is a determina-
tion that there is a certain amount of risk of harm where the govern-
ment’s interest can outweigh an individual’s liberty. A prediction of
dangerousness is on a spectrum. Some people may have a past that
indicates a stronger likelihood to engage in repeat behavior that
could cause a small amount of harm to society (a recalcitrant shop-
lifter), or a person may exhibit the risk to cause massive harm to peo-
ple (a person who threatened to bomb a government building). The
risk of danger involved in both scenarios lie on a spectrum and the
government interests in preventing that harm should not be treated
as the same. The Department of Homeland of Security recognizes
that danger is a risk analysis, which is what led to the employment
of risk assessment software and algorithms.195
Despite this consensus, the Board of Immigration Appeals con-
tinues to use language that undercuts this understanding and instead
treats an assessment of dangerousness less as a risk analysis and
more as a character trait. In Matter of Urena, an immigration judge
granted a $15,000 bond to a detainee who had an arrest history and
a conviction, and while doing so noted that the person’s release “pre-
sents a potential danger to the community.”196 The Board objected
to the Immigration Court’s use of “‘potential’ danger” without stat-
ing whether the person is dangerous or not, writing, “[d]angerous
aliens are properly detained without bond.”197 This rubric is wholly
incomparable with the criminal bail system, which actively seeks to
answer the question of reducing risk.198
Under the Bail Reform Act, the articulation of how to treat the
risk of danger is very different. The statute essentially has three
different stages of consideration of risk of danger: (1) release on own
recognizance or with unsecured bond unless release will endanger
the safety of any other person or the community;199 (2) conditions
can be ordered to ensure the safety of people or the community;200
and (3) a hearing can be conducted to prevent release if a person is
being charged with certain crimes and no conditions can ameliorate
195. See id.
196. Matter of Urena, 25 I&N Dec. 140, 141 (B.I.A. 2009).
197. Id. at 141.
198. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a)–(g).
199. Id. § 3142(b).
200. Id. § 3142(c).
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the risk of danger.201 First, under the criminal bond rubric, people
enjoy a presumption of release, and therefore a presumption of non-
dangerousness.202 Moreover under § 3143, the question of danger is
directed to the release and not to the person.203 Second, because the
statute provides a list of specific conditions that can be ordered to
reduce dangerousness, including no contact provisions, ordering
treatment, refraining from owning a firearm, curfews and reporting
requirement to law agencies, the court is able to lower any assessed
risk of danger to people or the community to an acceptable level.204
It is also one reason why the statute contemplates conditions that
the courts may impose to reduce such a risk to acceptable levels.205
Immigration judges are forced to consider danger on a binary
level as they are not given any tools or authority or reduce risk.
Although certain conditions can be imposed by the court, it has no
inherent power to order the Department of Homeland Security to
provide monitoring or the resources to enforce no-contact orders.206
Immigration judges are federal hearing officers, and their powers
are delineated by the INA statute and its regulations.207 The statute
and regulations do not empower the immigration courts to find
alternatives to custody or to see conditions to reduce the risk of
harm to the community.208 Without any inherent authority or direc-
tive to try and mitigate any risk the immigration judges may find,
immigration courts are forced to look at the risk of danger as a bi-
nary question and are incentivized to order custody when any risk
of danger exists.
C. The Undefined Danger
Not only is danger treated as a character trait, but there is no
guidance on how immigration judges are to decide the nature of
danger and how to balance the nature of that danger.209 This has led
to widely disparate formulations.210 For instance, one immigration
201. Id. § 3142(f).
202. See id. § 3142(b).
203. Id. § 3143(a)(1).
204. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(i)–(xiv).
205. See id. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(i)–(xiv).
206. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10 (2021) (describing the power of immigration judges).
207. Id.
208. In Rodriguez v. Robbins, the district court ordered immigration judges to consider
release using electronic monitoring, but it is unclear where the authority came from,
whether the immigration judge’s or the district court’s. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d
1127, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 2013).
209. See Gillman, supra note 24, at 211.
210. Compare C-E-—, AXXX XXX 716 (B.I.A. Aug. 14, 2018) with J-A-G-, AXXX XXX
146 (B.I.A. Dec. 17, 2018).
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judge found that a single incident of speeding at ninety-seven miles
per hour was enough to determine a danger to the community and
thus denied bond,211 while in another case an immigration judge
denied bail based on a Facebook picture showing the wearing of
alleged gang clothing.212 In both of these cases, the Board eventually
reversed, but the guidance it provided in the final decisions was
lacking.213 In a different case, an immigration judge found that a
person with a conviction for urinating on a Walmart display showed
sufficient propensity for dangerousness to deny bond, and the Board
agreed.214 The regulations provide no guidance, and the Board’s de-
cisions strain to give concrete examples or explanations for their
decisions. In a published decision, the Board reversed a grant of bond
to a person who had several DUI convictions in the past, yet, in sev-
eral unpublished decisions afterwards, the Board reversed denials
of bond based on DUI convictions and arrests.215 The confusion and
inability to narrow what “danger to people or property” actually
means, just creates a system favoring detention and ignoring harm
to detainees.
D. The Federal Criminal Bail System and Evaluation of Danger
The criminal bail system at least in form if not in practice (1)
treats danger to the community as a risk analysis rather than as a
character trait; (2) provides courts and judicial officers with the man-
date and power to reduce that risk; and (3) recognizes that danger to
the community can vary both in terms of seriousness and by nature.216
These features indicate that the government’s interest in protecting
the community from danger may have different weight, and thus
needs to be balanced. In some circumstances the risk of danger could
be high, conditions may not be available and the type of danger both
211. C-E-—, AXXX XXX 716 (B.I.A. Aug. 14, 2018) (finding respondent was not a danger
to the community based solely on his arrest for driving ninety-seven miles per hour where
the speed limit was seventy miles per hour).
212. J-A-G-, AXXX XXX 146 (B.I.A.Dec. 17, 2018) (reversing finding that respondent
would be a danger to the community and in which the Immigration Judge relied on Face-
book photographs of respondent wearing clothing allegedly worn by gang members and
an untested cooperating source).
213. See C-E-—, AXXX XXX 716 (“We acknowledge the Immigration Judge’s concerns.
However, on the record, before us we conclude that the respondent has met his burden
to establish that he does not pose a danger to the community.”); J-A-G-, AXXX XXX 146.
214. In re Henry Rolando Ventura-Lada, No.: AXXX XX2 316-BOS, 2008 WL 5477732,
at *1 (B.I.A. Dec. 12, 2008).
215. In re Siniauskas, 27 I&N Dec. 207, 207 (B.I.A. 2018).
216. See U.S.C. § 3142(a)–(c), (f)–(g).
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severe and life-threatening would weigh strongly for detention, despite
a person’s interest in freedom. This recognition of the variability of
the government’s interest in danger is reflected in both Salerno and
Foucha.217 In Salerno, the Supreme Court noted that the govern-
ment interest in protecting the community “is heightened when the
Government musters convincing proof that the arrestee, already
indicted or held to answer for a serious crime, presents a demonstra-
ble danger to the community.”218 While Justice O’Connor noted that
the government interest may be at its nadir when the nature of the
danger is lower,219 if the weight of the government’s interest in
protecting the community can vary, then under due process it must be
subject to scrutiny and weighed against the individual’s liberty
interest before it can infringe upon a person’s freedom.
Prior to any of the Bail Reform movements, many courts consid-
ered the health of the detainee in deciding whether and at what
amount to set bond.220 For example, a California appellate court
reversed the denial of bail for a man suffering from epilepsy who
appealed his conviction for embezzlement.221 In another case, the
California Supreme Court reversed the denial of bail for a man
suffering from severe heart disease who appealed his conviction,
finding that “the overwhelming weight of the evidence is that peti-
tioner’s condition is serious and that his surroundings are such that
not only his health but his life is in danger.”222 But even after the
1984 Bail Reform Act and Salerno, consideration of detention harm
was considered.223
While the Bail Reform of 1966 didn’t list any specific factors
relating to harm to the defendant, the 1984 version did. The statute
provided several “considerations” courts were to use in making their
custody decisions and listed them under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(g).224 These
217. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742–43 (1987); Foucha v. Louisiana,
504 U.S. 71, 83, 85–86 (1992).
218. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750.
219. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 88.
220. 18 Am. Jur. 2d Proof of Facts § 8 (2020) (“A significant factor taken into con-
sideration by the court in fixing bail at a smaller amount than would otherwise be required
of an accused charged with a similar offense is the health of the accused—specifically,
the fact that that accused’s condition is such that further confinement may impair his
health or endanger his life.”).
221. Ex parte Preciado, 158 P. 1063, 1064, 1067 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 1916).
222. In re Pantages, 291 P. 831, 833 (Cal. June 6, 1930).
223. See United States v. Martin, 447 F. Supp. 3d 399, 402 (D. Md. 2020); United States
v. Shaheed, 455 F. Supp. 3d 225, 229 (D. Md. 2020); United States v. Oaks, 793 Fed.
Appx. 744, 748 (10th Cir. 2019); see also United States v. Fattah, 351 F. Supp. 3d 1133,
1139 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
224. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(g).
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factors listed included the “characteristics of the person,” and listed,
“physical” and “mental condition” as one factor.225 District courts
have weighed whether a defendant’s medical issues could impact
them harmfully if detained under that ground.226 One interpretation
of the factors in § 3143(g) is that they are all addressing whether
conditions could assure appearance and safety of other people and
the community, and not whether custody is appropriate for the
detainee.227 Several district courts have used a different provision,
18 U.S.C. § 3143(i), to decide whether release is necessary based on
harm of detention.228 This provision lists that a detainee may peti-
tion for temporary release and the judicial officer may grant it if the
release is necessary to prepare for defense, or “for another compel-
ling reason.”229 Several district courts making pretrial release
decisions during the pandemic, analyzed potential exposure to
COVID-19 under this provision rather than the § 3143(g) factors.230
One of the interesting features of a § 3143(i) analysis is that it is
untethered to the questions of dangerousness or flight risk.231 The
provision allows for a broader reading of harm that doesn’t need to
be medical or one that is suffered by the defendant.232 The existence
of the provision does not mean that the temporary release provision
is commonly invoked or granted.233
225. Id.
226. See Martin, 447 F. Supp. 3d at 402; Shaheed, 455 F. Supp. 3d at 229 (analyzing
detainee’s health including past depression and asthma in context of COVID-19); Oaks,
793 Fed. Appx. at 748 (weighing the detainee’s desire of treatment of a broken nose and
sleep issues in his release decision); see also Fattah, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 1139 (considering
pregnancy as a factor, though only one factor in a release decision).
227. See United States v. Holguin, 791 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1089–90 (D. N.M. 2011) (finding
that pregnancy is not a factor unless weighed in terms of flight risk or danger).
228. See United States v. Clark, 448 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1156 (D. Kan. 2020). See also
United States v. Terrone, 454 F. Supp. 3d 1009, 1018–19 (D. Nev. 2020).
229. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)(4).
230. See Clark, 448 F. Supp. 3d at 1156 (“The risk of harm to the defendant does not
usually bear on this analysis. Rather, whether a defendant’s particular circumstances
warrant release in light of the COVID-19 pandemic ought to more properly considered
[sic] on a case-by-case basis under the ‘another compelling reason’ prong of § 3142(i)”);
see also Terrone, 454 F. Supp. 3d at 1018–19.
231. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(i).
232. See United States v. Lopez, 184 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1148–49 (D.N.M. 2016) (con-
sidering, but ultimately denying, release based on hardship to family, stating “[t]here
may be situations, however, that produce unusually severe effects on defendants and their
families. When these situations combine with the various other factors listed above, an
exceptional circumstance may arise.”).
233. See United States v. Loera, No. CR 13-1876 JB, 2017 WL 3098257, at *33–34
(D.N.M. June 22, 2017) (denying temporary release in order to have ilestomy procedure,
citing to cases where physical conditions needed to be extremely irregular to consider for
temporary release).
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One of the most illustrative examples of how harm of detention
to the defendant can be a grounds for release in pretrial detention
involved a case decided in 1993 during the AIDS crisis.234 In United
States v. Scarpa,235 a mafia captain was arrested and charged with
conspiracy to commit murder. At a detention hearing he was found
to be a danger, but the magistrate judge nonetheless allowed release
using conditions that would assure the safety of the community.236
The magistrate had relied on the defendant’s end stage diagnosis of
AIDS and concluded that home arrest would be sufficient.237 How-
ever, while under house arrest, he was involved in a gunfight, found
to have continued loan sharking and was shot in the face resulting
in loss of an eye.238 After having his bail revoked, he filed another re-
quest for bail, this time providing the testimony of his treating physi-
cian which opined, among a litany of other findings, that he needed
to be treated at a hospital with AIDS specialists.239
The Scarpa court ordered release of the defendant, but did not
resort to either the factors in §§ 3143(g) or in (i).240 Instead, the court
cited to cases in which release of pretrial detention were granted
based on the length of detention.241 The Second Circuit had previously
listed several considerations that would justify release if pretrial
detention became prolonged, and the Scarpa court cited to this pre-
cedent but added two of its own.242 These two factors were a person’s
medical condition and the effect of detention on family members.243
In using the prolonged detention precedent, the Scarpa court recog-
nized that the actual detention length was not significant (less than
one month), but nonetheless found that his terminal illness was
reason enough to release him for treatment in the hospital under
guard.244 The reliance on prolonged detention precedent was a rec-
ognition that an individual’s liberty interest can become great enough
to overcome the government’s interest in protecting against the risk
of danger to the community.
234. 815 F. Supp. 88, 89 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 90.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Scarpa, 815 F. Supp. at 91–93.
241. Id. at 91.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 91 (“Additional factors not adverted to by the Court of Appeals include: (iv)
the defendant’s medical condition; (v) the effect on his family while he is incarcerated;
and (vi) conditions that can mitigate the dangers supporting detention.”).
244. Id. at 92.
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IV. PROCESS CLAUSE REQUIRES CONSIDERATION OF
INDIVIDUAL HARMS OF DETENTION
Potential violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments are split into two distinct types of claims,
substantive due process and procedural due process.245 In substan-
tive due process claims, there are usually two types of inquiries, the
first is whether a person’s life, liberty, or property are deprived in an
arbitrary manner, such that it “shocks the conscience,” and the sec-
ond is whether a statutory scheme interferes with rights “implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty”, i.e., a fundamental right.246 In order
to understand if a right is “fundamental” a court is supposed to first
carefully describe the right and then examine its historical roots.247
If a fundamental right is applied, then the government action can only
pass constitutional muster if it is narrowly tailored to a compelling
government interest.248
Aside from these two different tests, when deciding constitutional
claims for pretrial detainees, courts have also used the three-part test
found in Bell v. Wolfish249 to determine whether the detention has
become “punishment” and therefore violative of the right to be free
from punishment without an adjudication of guilt.250 The Bell v.
Wolfish test is used to make sure that civil detention remains civil
and not an end run to criminal punishment.251 No matter which of
the various tests would be imposed, a person’s individualized harm
must be considered on a non-facial challenge to civil or regulatory
custody decisions.
An application of any of the tests could be used to decide whether
immigration detention violates due process. For example, a decision
by Immigration and Customs Enforcement to detain a four-month-old
infant away from his mother could reasonably be viewed as “shock-
ing” the conscience, and the fact that a four-month-old would suffer
great harm by that detention would weigh strongly on the question
245. Jackson v. Gutzmer, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221943 at *23–24 (D. Minn. Sept. 28,
2018).
246. The fundamental rights issue comes from Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
324–26 (1937) and Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
247. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997).
248. Id.
249. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–40 (1979).
250. It is unclear whether the Bell test is part of the implicit rights test, or the shocks
the conscience test, or even now considered a third formulation, as the Supreme Court
in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015) did not use either test. See Rosalie
Berger Levinson, Kingsley Breathes New Life into Substantive Due Process as a Check
on Abuse of Government Power, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 357, 366–69 (2017).
251. See Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535–40.
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of whether the government action was arbitrary.252 Similarly, under
an implicit rights claim, the four month old, with the help of counsel,
would be able to argue that the government’s actions in detaining
him would not be sufficiently narrowly tailored when applied to him
as an infant, as infants are neither dangerous or flight risks.253 And
finally, under the Bell v. Wolfish test, the third prong of the test—
whether the confinement could be considered “excessive”—would
also be easier to meet with an infant detainee complainant, where
detention and separation could be considered “excessive.”254 In all
three scenarios, the government interests had to be set against the
individual’s liberty interest.
Bell v. Wolfish’s three-part test to decide whether confinement
constitutes punishment is especially illustrative. The Supreme Court
in its most recent due process case involving pretrial confinement used
this test, and the Salerno court relied heavily upon it as well.255 The
test has three components: first, to decide whether the custody or
the condition of custody was imposed for the purpose of punishment.256
It is likely that any specific immigration custody decision would pass
this first test, as the custody itself, authorized under the statute has
been continually described as a proper nonpunitive form of deten-
tion.257 The second prong is whether there is a legitimate govern-
ment interest furthered by the detention or condition, and again,
given Wong, Carlson, and Demore, courts would likely find that any
such custody would pass this test in any given case, precisely because
it would invoke either flight risk or danger to the community.258 It
252. This example is based on government action at the border in the separation of
babies from their mothers, including a four month old. See Caitlin Dickerson, The Youngest
Child Separated from His Family at the Border was 4 Months Old, N.Y. TIMES (June 16,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/16/us/baby-constantine-romania-migrants.html
[https://perma.cc/253X-URU4]; see also ACLU Mem. Support Mot. Prelim. Inj. At 18, Ms.
L. v. ICE, Case No. 18-cv-00428-DMS-MDD (2019), https://www.aclu.org/legal-document
/ms-l-v-ice-memo-support-motion-enforce-pi [https://perma.cc/987L-944H] (the court has
described the action as one that “shocks conscience”).
253. See Washington, 521 U.S. at 720–21.
254. Bell, 441 U.S. at 537–38. The author would like to note that the Supreme Court
in both Schall and Reno seemed to consider a minor’s right to be free from confinement
in a very unintuitive way, declaring that their liberty interest may be lessened as all
children are in a “form of custody.” Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984); Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993). It seems very odd to describe a child living with their
family as a means of custody.
255. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746–47 (1987). Because the Salerno court
had only considered the challenge as a facial one, there was never any consideration to
whether a specific pretrial custody could be considered “excessive,” it only needed to look
at the first two prongs of the Bell test. Id. at 741, 746–48.
256. Bell, 441 U.S. at 535–38.
257. But see HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 14, at 1351–59 for an argument as to how immi-
gration imprisonment would fail the first prong of the test.
258. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1895); Carlson v. Landon,
342 U.S. 524, 537–38 (1952); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518 (2003).
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is the third and final prong where harm plays a starring role. For the
third prong requires an assessment of whether the custody appears
“excessive” in relation to the legitimate custodial interest.259 The
issue of excessiveness had until 2015 been unclear whether it uses
a subjective assessment or an objective one, but the Supreme Court
in Kingsley v. Hendrickson ruled that objective evidence could be
used, divorced from subjective intent.260 In order to decide whether
custody, despite serving a legitimate purpose, could nonetheless be
excessive, the harms it imposes can be a crucial factor. The impris-
onment of a terminally ill man, such as in Scarpa discussed supra
can become excessive the closer he is to dying in custody and need-
ing specific health care.261
Ever since Salerno, the Supreme Court has recognized that what
may be nonpunitive to one person in the ordinary administration
can become punishment when imposed on another. In Salerno, the
Court recognized that it was not deciding the question of whether
regulatory nonpunitive punishment can transform into punitive
detention if the detention becomes punitive.262 Most courts have
recognized this principle in the criminal context, as this was the
basis of Scarpa’s decision, the precedent that the Second Circuit
found to apply.263 This principle has continued in the immigration
custody context as well.
One illustrative example of how a constitutional framework
would mandate consideration of individual harms of detention comes
from a scenario where neither Congress nor regulations provide guid-
ance. Starting in 2012, circuit courts began to examine whether pro-
longed detention under the mandatory detention statute of 1226(c)
could become constitutionally suspect after six months or more.264
Congress had mandated custody without release and did not con-
sider “prolonged” detention, and thus there were no statutes or reg-
ulations that contemplated release under these scenarios. The circuit
courts used a constitutional avoidance strategy to try and reinterpret
259. Bell, 441 U.S. at 538.
260. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2472–73 (2015); see also Levinson, supra
note 250, at 371–77 (discussing how the shift to an objective test could result in a lower
burden); Arielle Tolman, Sex Offender Civil Commitment to Prison Post-Kingsley, 113
NW. U. L. REV. 155, 187–89 (2018).
261. See United States v. Scarpa, 815 F. Supp. 88, 92 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
262. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754–55 (1987).
263. See Coleman Gay, Hour Late on Your Bail, Spend the Weekend in Jail: Substan-
tive Due Process and Pretrial Detention, 60 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP II. 237, 237–38 (2019)
(discussing the recent circuit court splits whereby the 10th Circuit breaks from the
majority in finding no punishment or due process violation when a person is held after
posting bail for several days).
264. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013).
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the statutes as requiring reasonableness and ordered bond hearings
after detention became prolonged.265 In 2018 the Supreme Court in
Jennings v. Rodriguez ruled that the use of constitutional avoidance
was not appropriate and that Congress had in fact intended deten-
tion regardless of length of detention but explicitly did not decide
the constitutional question of whether prolonged detention could at
some point offend due process.266
After Jennings, courts had to decide what the constitutional
limitations were on prolonged mandatory detention absent any
guidance from Congress. Several district courts revisited the pro-
longed detention question for those held in INA 236(c) mandatory
detention and began to hold that as detention becomes prolonged,
the regulatory interest diminishes and the individual’s liberty in-
terest increases which offends due process.267 In 2020, the Third
Circuit affirmed a district court finding and ruled that these claims
are best dealt with as applied challenges as the question as to the
detention’s reasonableness are factually specific.268 The court fo-
cused on four specific factual inquiries: (1) the length of detention,
(2) the likelihood of continued detention, (3) the reasons for the
delay, and finally (4) the conditions of confinement.269 These condi-
tions mirror closely the precedent that the Scarpa court relied upon
when it added the considerations of health and harm to the detainee’s
family.270 Other district courts, from Minnesota to Massachusetts all
held that prolonged mandatory detention can offend due process and
used a factual factor test and they all listed as one factor the “condi-
tions of confinement” an implicit invitation to examine whether the
harm of detention can justify its “regulatory” label.271
Once it is recognized that the “reasonableness,” or, in other words,
the punitive nature of the detention depends on specific factual con-
sideration, such as the conditions of confinement, and whether they
265. Id. at 1144; Diop v. ICE, 656 F.3d 221, 231, 235 (3d Cir. 2011); Hamama v.
Adducci, 285 F. Supp. 3d 997, 1016–17 (E.D. Mich. 2018).
266. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 836, 842–43 (2018).
267. See, e.g., Portillo v. Hott, 322 F. Supp. 3d 698, 708–10 (E.D. Va. 2018).
268. Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 19-2663, at 8–9 (3d Cir. 2020).
269. Id. at 14–15.
270. Cf. United States v. Orena, 986 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir. 1993) (“To determine
whether the length of a pretrial detention violates a defendant’s due process rights, we
must weigh: (i) the length of detention; (ii) the extent of the prosecution’s responsibility
for the delay of the trial; and (iii) the strength of the evidence upon which the detention
was based, in this case, evidence of Amato’s danger to the community.”).
271. Muse v. Sessions, 409 F. Supp. 3d 707, 715 (D. Minn. 2018) (recognized that factors
still hold post-Jennings by Bolus A. D. v. Sec’y of Homeland Sec., 376 F. Supp. 3d 959 (D.
Minn. 2019); Reid v. Donelan, 390 F. Supp. 3d 201 (D. Mass. 2019)); see also Brito v.
Barr, 415 F. Supp. 3d 258 (D. Mass. 2019).
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are “excessive,” then it becomes easy to see why a consideration of
harm to a detainee must be involved in the custody decisions em-
ployed by both ICE and by immigration judges.
CONCLUSION
Establishing that harms of detention must be considered in
custody decisions is only the first step. The criminal pretrial system
and the Salerno decision should serve as a cautionary tale. For even
as the immigration system failed to incorporate important lessons
on the nature of dangerousness allowing it to turn a blind eye to
harm, even a cursory examination of the pretrial criminal detention
shows the distance between practice and promise.
Despite the attempts in the 1960s to lift the burden of detention
from the poor, the cash bail system continues to be a tool to hold the
poor in jail.272 Even though the actual language of Salerno was more
measured, its impact was not, and it reversed many of the gains
from the 1966 Bail Reform Act and resulted in many more people
held in custody and with the added stigma of being labeled “too
dangerous” to be free. As one commentator writes:
For decades following the 1980s changes to bail administration,
most reform advocates saw only a bleak legal landscape. With its
casual and undeveloped yet definitive finding that “preventing
danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal,” Salerno
seemed firmly to shut the door to any constitutional argument
against the use of pretrial detention to prevent the commission
of future crime.273
The incorporation of some considerations of the harm of deten-
tion is not enough to prevent the default use of imprisonment. Even
as pretrial detention undergoes a new reform period, there is no
reason that the immigration custody system needs to lag behind.
The same lesson can be seen from the parole power and its reg-
ulations. Despite explicit recognition that medical vulnerability and
the requirement to consider the harms of incarceration, traumatized
people are subjected to needless detention. Creating mechanisms to
recognize the harms of incarceration is not enough on its own, espe-
cially when weighed against the stigma and label of dangerousness.
272. Odonnell v. Harris Cnty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (concluding that
a class action lawsuit that found the Harris County bail system that capitalized the in-
digency of criminal defendants in 2017, more than thirty years after Salerno).
273. Van Brunt & Bowman, supra note 13, at 742.
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The mechanisms created must mandate a proper weighing of
the actual damage of imprisonment with the amorphous and often
ill-defined risk of danger to the community.
Using the label of danger to justify detention is an easy tool to
ignore the pain and suffering of those held in custody. Declaring a
system as preventing harm to the community makes it easy to
discount and ignore the pain of those declared to be the threat to the
community. Nonetheless, the hope is that a system that properly
takes account of the pain inflicted on individuals by incarceration
would force a reckoning with how those harms aggregate to devas-
tate the very community that detention is purported to protect.
